Introduction

The Concepts of City-State and City-State Culture

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As is well known, one of the greatest steps forward in the history of mankind has been the transition from hunting and gathering to herding and agriculture as the principal source of nourishment. In the Mediterranean world this so-called "neolithic" or "agricultural revolution" took place some 10,000 years ago; and it had its centre in the Near East,[1] from where it spread continuously but slowly so that it reached northern Europe some 4,000 years later. Thus, in Denmark the shift from hunting and gathering to farming and husbandry is now dated to ca. 4,000 B.C.[2]

The agricultural revolution had many far-reaching consequences of which two are especially important in this context. First, the increased carrying capacity of fertile regions resulted in a growth of population[3] and, concomitantly, in a higher density of population.[4] Second, excepting the nomads to whom I shall return later, most people became sedentary and less inclined to move about. The settlements of agriculturalists became both larger and more permanent than those of the hunter-gatherers (Clark [1978] 58-73). Now, a sedentary population can live either dispersed in isolated farmsteads or nucleated in settlements which, according to size and function, are either villages or towns.[5] The shift from hunting and gathering to agriculture was almost everywhere followed by a transition from dispersed to nucleated settlement. "If a single feature has to stand for the neolithic 'revolution', it is the existence of permanent villages of cultivators" (Maisels [1990] 116). But the trend is not uniform: small permanent nucleated settlements are found already in the mesolithic period,[6] and, conversely, habitation in isolated farmsteads is amply attested in all later periods.[7] What was new, however, was that agriculture – followed by sedentarisation and population growth – paved the way for urbanisation,[8] although sometimes millennia have passed between the introduction of agriculture and the rise of cities.[9] There is, however, no attested example of the reverse development: that urbanisation came first and forced people to take up agriculture in order to feed a sizable nucleated population. The theory has, of course, been aired, but it has been rejected almost unanimously as impossible because of what has been called "the tyranny of distance". In a non-agricultural society food for an urban population would have had to be carried over so long distances that it would be consumed during transport by those who carried it.[10]

Urbanisation and the Concept of Town or City[11]

The emergence of agriculture followed by urbanisation is attested in China, in India, in the Near East in the so-called fertile crescent,[12] in Africa south of the Sahara, and in Meso- and South America. In all six cases urbanisation was spontaneous and autonomous.[13] Furthermore, it can be argued that urbanisation emerged autonomously in several different places of each continent. Urbanisation is indisputably one of the major long-term consequences of the neolithic revolution, and it is no surprise that the oldest urban centres in our part of the world have been found in the Near East, precisely where the agricultural revolution started (Mellaart [1975] 5-22). The most famous are Çatal Hüyük in Turkey (from ca. 6500 B.C.),[14] Jericho in Israel (from before ca. 7000 B.C.),[15] Mehrgarh in northern India (from ca. 7000 B.C.),[16] and Sesklo in Thessaly ca. 4800-4400 B.C.[17]

But what is a town? And what constitutes the difference between a town and a village? This problem has attracted the attention of many sociologists, especially since the posthumous publication in 1921 of Max Weber's article *Die Stadt. Eine Soziologische Untersuchung*.[18] According to Weber, a town is a nucleated settlement in which the houses are built so densely that they often stand wall to wall, and in which are accommodated so many people that they no longer know one another in the way the population of a village always does (727). The economy of a town is

characterised by specialisation of function and division of labour so that the inhabitants satisfy an essential part of their daily needs in the local market by exchanging or buying the goods they do not produce themselves (728). Urbanisation puts an end to subsistence economy, and that applies also to towns in which a large number of inhabitants are farmers (*Ackerbürger*) who every day walk to their fields in the hinterland of the towns (730-1). The concentration of a large number of people in a nucleated settlement entails that there is a stronger imperative than previously to lay down and enforce rules of social behaviour and to regulate how the benefits of the community are to be shared.[19] The specialisation of function applies to the political as well as to the economic structure of the town. As a community a town is a self-governing association with special political and administrative institutions (732). Weber, whose focus is the ancient western town conceived as a community of citizens, singles out the following five characteristics of what he calls a *Stadtgemeinde*: (1) a defence circuit, (2) a market, (3) laws and lawcourts, (4) political decision-making, and (5) at least partial autonomy (736). Weber's view of the political and administrative aspects of the western city will be discussed *infra* 602-9. What I want to single out in this context is his subtle description of the city as a nucleated centre. With variations and some additions his criteria have been repeated in all later discussions of the topic and can be subsumed under the following six headings: in order to be a "city" – or "town" – a nucleated settlement must have: (1) a population of some size (2) densely settled in permanent dwellings (3) and practising a specialisation of function and division of labour (4) so that they acquire an essential part of their necessaries of life by trade and not by production. (5) The nucleated form of settlement entails a more institutionalised form of organisation than required by dispersed settlement, (6) and the settlement becomes the social, economic, religious and military centre of its immediate hinterland.[20] In its fully institutionalised form the city becomes a political centre too, and urbanisation goes hand in hand with state formation. The question: what is a town? leads on to the next question: what is a state? and what is the difference between the state and other forms of social and political organisation?

State Formation and the Concept of State

In order to answer these questions we have to face an interdisciplinary clash of views. In jurisprudence, political science and philosophy the concept of state is typically traced back to Hobbes and Machiavelli;[21] and the type of state which corresponds to this concept is the sovereign "territorial state" or "nation state" which emerged in Europe in consequence of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. It is this concept of state which lies behind the contemporary subdivision of the world into 189 territorial states.[22] To speak about states before 1648 or, at least, before Machiavelli, is rejected as an anachronism.[23] In jurisprudence and political science it is almost universally accepted that three elements are involved in the concept of a state: a territory, a people and a government with the sole right to exercise a given legal order within a given area over a given population.[24] However, when the emphasis is on the concept of the state rather than just the elements and important characteristics of a state, at least three further requirements must be added. First, the state is more than the sum of the three elements, i.e. it is not just "a geographically delimited segment of human society united by common obedience to a single sovereign" (Watkins [1972] 150). By a kind of abstraction and de-personification the state has become "a continuous public power above both ruler and ruled" (Skinner [1978] II.353). The second requirement concerns the concept of sovereignty: a community must have a *sovereign* government and be in possession of full external sovereignty in order to be a state (Oppenheim [1992] 122-6). The third requirement involves the concept of society, often called civil society: the distinction between state and civil society is a characteristic of the modern state (Bobbio [1989] 22-43), and especially in liberal democratic thought it has become common to hold that a political system which does not acknowledge this distinction is not a state in the proper sense of the term (Vincent [1987] 22-4, 112-14). With no less than six different characteristics, some of them even complex, the definition of state comes closer to a Weberian ideal type than to a definition in the strict sense (Heuss [1968] 64-79). But the plurality of descriptive criteria is a characteristic of most modern definitions of "state" (Pierson [1996] 8; Dunleavy [1993] 611); and it enables us to subsume under one concept what has often been taken to be evidence of a plurality of concepts of state.

Sociologists, anthropologists, archaeologists and historians, on the other hand, avail themselves of a broader concept of state according to which the term applies to, e.g., ancient Egypt, China since antiquity, France since the Middle Ages, the Inca empire before the Spanish conquest, and Kuba in Congo before the

Belgian colonisation.[25] Historians are notorious for not defining the concepts they use, but anthropologists, sociologists and archaeologists often use the following model when they describe the development of political organisation, with state-formation as the ultimate step.

The original socio-political entity found among hunters and gatherers is called a "band". A band consists of anything between a score and a few hundred persons and, apart from the family and the household, there is no other form of institutionalised organisation (Service [1971] 59-109).

Agriculturalists and nomads develop much larger and more complicated units, usually called "tribes" with, principally, two charasteristics: they are segmentary and based on unilineal descent. That the tribe is segmentary means that it is organised as a nest of Chinese boxes. The smallest unit is the family, a number of families constitutes a lineage, several lineages make up a clan, and several clans unite to form a tribe. The system can be even more complicated with sub-clans and sub-tribes. There is often an overlap between groups at different levels, so that a tribe is a complicated network of criss-crossing groups. That the tribe is based on unilineal descent means that membership of a group at any level is determined by factual or fictive consanguinity. In the family consanguinity is a fact, in the clan and almost invariably in the tribe consanguinity is either purely fictive or so diluted that it can no longer be verified, but is linked to some common mythical ancestor. Tribes often develop rudimentary political institutions. They can have a council of elders and often, but far from always, they are ruled by a "chief". Tribes without a chief are called "acephalous"; those ruled by a chief are often grouped together and called "chiefdoms".[26]

The next level of political organisation is the state, which is characterised by specialised and hierarchically organised decision-making institutions and administrative organs which have monopolised the legitimate use of physical force. Thus a state is a centralised legitimate government in possession of the sole right to enforce a given legal order within a territory over a population.[27] Whereas the tribe represents a natural progression from the band, the state emerges by a breach of evolution.[28] Tribe and state are mostly diametrically opposed types of organisation,[29] and state formation is often accompanied by reforms which aim to break up the old kinship groups and have them replaced by new and often territorially based types of organisation.[30] Finally, many anthropologists and sociologists who have written about the political organisation of early and/or primitive societies have been inspired by Marxist analysis, and they emphasise as an essential element of the state that the tribal organisation is replaced by a "social stratification" by which they mean that society (as opposed to the state) is split up in at least two opposed classes, with the state as the political system controlled by the ruling class in order to perpetuate its domination over society.[31]

Now, apart from the specific Marxist insistence on a stratified society, all the other characteristics are common to the anthropo-sociological and the politico-philosophical concept of state. The essential features are in both cases: a *centralised government* in possession of the necessary *means of coercion* by which the *legal order* can be enforced in a *territory* over a *population*. The difference is that the politico-philosophical version of the concept insists on, at least, two further defining characteristics: first, *sovereignty* as the basis of government,[32] and second, that the state is more than the government of a geographically defined population: it is also an *abstract juristic person*, i.e. a public power above both ruler and ruled.[33] Both these requirements are implicitly and sometimes even explicitly rejected by anthropologists and sociologists.[34]

There is one more essential difference between the two concepts of state: the anthropo-sociological concept of state is a modern heuristic concept, and accordingly it can be applied to any community which fulfils the criteria outlined above (Tilly [1994] 14). It can also be changed by any scholar who wants to exclude some of the criteria and include some others. The politico-philosophical concept of state is a historical concept in the sense that it is linked to the term "state" and is taken to apply only if a community calls itself a state (état, Staat, stato, estado, etc.) or is called a state by contemporary authors. That is why the concept is restricted geographically to the western world and chronologically to the period after Machiavelli who was the first major political theorist to use the term *stato* to designate one of the basic concepts of his philosophy (Dyson [1987] 590-1). It goes without saying that this concept of state (stato, état, etc.) can be understood and its historical development can be described, but it cannot be changed, except in the sense that a future scholar may perhaps understand Machiavelli's concept of *stato* better than any scholar has done so far. In this investigation which covers world history from the fourth millennium B.C. to the nineteenth century A.D. I must, of course, apply the broader concept of state used by anthropologists, sociologists, most archaeologists and some historians.[35]

To put it very crudely the global pattern seems to have been that the agrarian revolution resulted in sedentary habitation and population growth, two factors which, again, paved the way for urbanisation as well as for state formation. That this evolution is universal is supported by the observation that, like urbanisation, state formation seems to have emerged independently in at least seven different regions, *viz.*, in Mesopotamia, in Egypt, in India, in China, in Africa, in Mesoamerica and in South America.[36]

The Relation between Urbanisation and State Formation

Having defined both what a town is and what a state is the time has come for the crucial question: what is the relation between urbanisation and state formation? Are the two phenomena inextricably intertwined? or are there states without towns? and, conversely, can towns be found in countries which have not yet developed political institutions at the state level?

Only a generation ago it was commonly held that in all continents there were states whose population was settled either dispersed or in villages but never in towns or cities.[37] The two historical examples most frequently cited were ancient Egypt (Wilson [1960] 124-36), and the Mayas in the classical period, ca. 300-900 A.D. (Thompson [1954] 57; Adams [1960] 273). But in both cases the contention has been disproved by the archaeologists. Excavations along the Nile[38] and in the Yucatan Peninsula[39] have disclosed nucleated settlements in which houses had been made of cheap and perishable materials so that they have been securely identified only by the more refined methods applied in recent archaeological research. Some of these urban centres surrounded monumental temples which, then, were not situated in isolation but as centres of nucleated settlements.

Anthropologists, too, maintain that examples of "early states" without urbanisation are attested both historically in early societies and sociologically in contemporary primitive societies. In a major comparative study of twenty-three "early states", including ancient Egypt, the editors conclude that urbanisation is missing from nine of these societies and that, consequently, urbanisation is not an essential element of state formation (Claessen & Skalník [1978] 538, 540-1). But in Egypt, as mentioned above, early towns have been unearthed by recent excavations. In three other cases the centre of the state was a palace surrounded by a nucleated settlement which must have accommodated several thousand persons. These sites

are correctly described as the state's capital,[40] and their specific character as palace-towns is enough to question the authors' claim that these communities were early states without cities. In two more cases it is questionable whether the communities can be described as "early states".[41] As the seventh example, Mongolia is adduced as a manifestation of a nomadic state, see *infra*. Thus, there are just two reasonably well attested examples of early states in which the only known form of nucleated settlement is the village, *viz.*, the two small African states Ankole, north of Uganda (see Appendix 2 *infra* 25-6), and Zande in Sudan.[42] Other examples can easily be found, e.g., the Anglo-Saxon states in the early Middle Ages (Arnold [1997] 211-30); but if the twenty-three selected exemples are representative, the conclusion of the investigation is rather that there is a remarkably close connection between urbanisation and state formation.

I now return to the Mongol empire created by Genghis Khan in the decades before his death in 1227 and extended by his successors. The Mongols were nomads and their great camp of tents at Karakorum was not a town. Nevertheless, the Mongols succeeded in creating what must be called a state structure: a centralised government in possession of the power and the personnel to enforce a legal order over the Mongols and the peoples they had subjected.[43] But is that enough to classify Mongolia as an "early" state? The Mongols who ruled central Asia and eastern Europe were still nomads, and their "empire" did not constitute a defined territory with a permanent population. If a settled people in a defined territory is a defining characteristic of the state, the Mongol empire was *not* a state. In conformity with this view Attila's Huns, Genghis Khan's Mongols and other nomadic peoples are omitted from Finer's monumental *The History of Government*.[44] But to insist on a settled population as a *sine qua non* for statehood is part of the politico-historical view of the state as identical with the European territorial state, created by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. According to "the Westphalian Model" *a permanent population* and *a defined territory* are still two of the four defining characteristics of the state as stipulated in Section one of the Montevideo declaration of 1933.[45] But when, in 1949, an international committee debated the need for an updated definition of the concept of state, it was pointed out that the insistence on a *permanent* population ought to be reformulated, or perhaps even deleted, precisely because nomadic peoples were thereby excluded from being recognised as states.[46] Even so, nomads who reach the level of statehood are exception-

al, and if "a permanent population settled in a defined territory" is upheld as an indispensable condition for statehood, nomads can be disregarded in an investigation of the concepts of state and city-state.[47]

On the other hand, another historic society included among the twenty-three case studies is Medieval Norway, which is listed as an example of statehood combined with urbanisation (Gurevich [1978] 403-23). That is a qualified truth. The Norwegian monarchy was established by Harald Fairhair (ca. 900) and consolidated by Olav Tryggvesson (994-1000) (Sveaas Andersen [1977]). But the largest nucleated settlement in Norway during this period was the small trade station (Kaupang) in Oslo Fjord, perhaps accommodating some 500 persons.[48] No historian has yet ventured to call Kaupang a town. The earliest Norwegian towns cannot be traced further back than the 11th century.[49] Thus, more than a century passed between the formation of a Norwegian state and the emergence of Norwegian urban centres. During this period Norway must have been a state without towns. And the same sequence is attested in Denmark and Sweden.[50] Yet, the more important point may well be that state-formation preceded urbanisation by one century only, and that the two phenomena were intertwined hereafter. Thus, Medieval Norway may, after all, be adduced as an example of the connection between state formation and urbanisation (Andrén [1994] 131).

The overall conclusion is that examples of states without towns are few and far between. But, conversely, how many examples can be found of stateless, but urbanised societies? According to, e.g., B. Trigger: "the state is a necessary concomitant of urban life".[51] But a closer study of urbanisation in Africa may suggest a different answer: thus, the Yakö in SE Nigeria are settled in towns of between 2,000 and 11,000 inhabitants. Every town is subdivided into almost self-governing wards whose structure is based on territorial patriclans, but at the same time a town is governed by a council whose composition is based on non-territorial matriclans. There is no central government, and the leaders of the clans do not possess the power and the personnel by which they can enforce the accepted norms (Forde [1964] esp. 1-6, 135-6, 165-209; see Appendix 3, *infra* 26-7).

Moving from anthropology to archaeology, once again the Africanists are in focus. In Mali they have excavated a surprisingly large conurbation composed of two neighbouring centres, Jenné-Jeno and Hambarketolo, surrounded by a number of villages all lying within a radius of one km from the centres. The conurbation emerged in the late 1st century B.C. and in the 8th century A.D. the two centres covered an area of 41 ha and accommodated a population of at least 5,000 persons and perhaps many more. No trace of an urban elite was found, and the excavators suggest that Jenné-Jeno is a historical example of a stateless urbanised community (McIntosh [1995] 372-98).

With this example in mind I want to return to the roots of Mediterranean civilisation. The accepted view is that Jericho, Çatal Hüyük and Mehrgarh were towns in a stateless society.[52] That may well be the case, but it must be kept in mind that there is no proof. We know nothing about the political organisation of the peoples living in Palestine, Turkey and India in the neolithic age, or – for that matter – in Africa. But we cannot, *a priori*, rule out the possibility that statehood in these cases is as old as urbanisation. It has, in fact, been argued that, in ca. 5,600 B.C., Jericho must have been a city-state (Finer [1997] 99). Jericho may have been a village rather than a town (see n. 15), but let us not forget that the large Celtic Iron Age *oppida* were built according to a rational town plan which is an indication of an advanced political structure, perhaps at the level of statehood (Collis, *infra* 234).

The anthropological study of primitive societies provides us with some attestations of stateless but urbanised societies as well as of states without towns. By analogy such types of society can be applied as models in interpretation of archaeological evidence. But urbanisation and statehood seem to coexist in all civilisations in which written sources supplement the archaeological remains. One may precede the other, but only by a relatively short period, perhaps a century, whereas millennia may pass before the emergence of agriculture is followed by state formation and urbanisation. Often urbanisation and state formation emerge simultaneously and in close correlation.

To sum up, urbanisation and state formation go hand in hand, but the relation between the two phenomena differs: usually an "early state" covers a comparatively large territory encompassing a plurality of towns. Examples are ancient Egypt, the Inca empire, and the states that emerged in Medieval Europe after the Germanic migrations.[53] Sometimes, however, we find a one-to-one relation between urbanisation and state formation: every town is the centre of a small state comprising the town plus its immediate hinterland and, conversely, every state is a micro-state centred on a town which controls a small territory. Such a state is, correctly in my opinion, called a city-state,[54] and whenever a whole region is split up into city-states we have what I suggest calling a city-state culture.

The City-State versus the Territorial State

In most general discussions of types of state, the city-state is opposed to "the territorial state".[55] This classification is based on two assumptions: (a) that territoriality is a defining characteristic by which large states can be distinguished from city-states, and (b) that the term "territorial state" denotes a well-defined type of state to be contrasted with the city-state. Like Finer (1997) I: 6-7, I must object to such an analysis as seriously misleading. A city-state is a territorial state just as much as any macro-state with multiple urban centres. It has a small territory (mostly = the immediate hinterland) but nevertheless a territory with, usually, well-defined borders. The opposite of the territorial state is the non-territorial state of which one example is the nomadic state, see *supra* page 14, and another is the feudal state: in Medieval Europe the powers established by a lord over his vassals were based on personal bonds irrespective of where the vassals were living. The feudal state was a patchwork of often disconnected small pieces of land. The concept of the territorial state stems from the concept of the post-Westphalian European state which was indeed a territorial state by contrast with the earlier feudal form of state.[56] But this correct use of the concept has led to the erroneous belief that the concept of the territorial state can be used about all large states and, in this broader sense, as an opposition to the concept of the city-state. While "city-state" is, probably, one reasonably well-defined type of state, what is traditionally subsumed under the label "the territorial state" comprises states of different types, e.g. modern Denmark (a nation state in the true sense), Medieval France (an essentially non-territorial feudal state), or Rome from 27 B.C. to A.D. 395 (a multi-ethnic empire).

If we have to give up the term "territorial state" as a type of state opposed to the city-state, which term can then be used as an antonym of city-state? The obvious one would be "country-state", for the following reason: in many languages the words for an urban centre and its hinterland form a pair of antonyms, e.g., city/country (English), Stadt/Land (German), cité/pays (French), città/paese (Italian), by/land (Danish), polis/chora (ancient Greek), ilu/ileto (Yoruba), birni/karaka (Hausa), guo/ye (Chinese), negara/desa (Indonesian, from Sanskrit).[57] Whenever the political organisation of a region resulted in the formation of a city-state culture, it was usually the word for city which came to denote the political community, i.e. the state,[58] whereas in macro-states it has been the word for country which is also used synonymously with state. Consequently, country-state would be a perfect antonym of city-state, instead of the inappropriate term "territorial state". The term "country-state" was, in fact, suggested by Henry Sidgwick in ca. 1900, followed by Finer in 1997, both rejecting the term "territorial state" as a misnomer in this context (Finer [1997] 6-7). Knowing, however, how difficult it is to persuade scholars to adopt a new term, however suitable, to replace a familiar one, however inappropriate, I prefer not to press the issue and suggest instead speaking of macro-states.

Thus, in the following, I shall use "macro-state" as the least objectionable replacement of the misleading term "territorial state" to denote states in possession of a large territory dotted with urban centres, of which one is the capital. The city-state is, of course, a micro-state; it is the most common form of micro-state, but not the only one. In the modern world Nauru is a non-urbanised micro-state, and, in a historical context, it suffices here to mention Schwyz, Uri and Unterwalden, the three original members of the Swiss Confederacy of 1291. In the late Middle Ages they were states just as much as the neighbouring city-states: Bern, Luzern, Zürich etc. The first attested meeting of a *Landsgemeinde* (the sovereign popular assembly in the small Swiss cantons) is one held in Schwyz in 1294. But Schwyz, Uri and Unterwalden were agrarian micro-states, not city-states (Ryffel [1903]).[59]

The Concept of City-State Culture

To describe the various types of macro-state is outside the scope of the present study, which is devoted to a comparative study of city-states. A main point in the research conducted by the Polis Centre has been to distinguish the concept of city-state from the concept of city-state culture.[60] This concept is construed as a Weberian ideal type, and not one single city-state culture shares all the following characteristics.[61]

(1) A region is inhabited by people who speak the same language and share a common culture.[62]

(2) For a considerable period of time, i.e. for centuries, the region is politically divided up into a large number of small political communities of a common type, which today we call "city-states".[63]

(3) From a geopolitical point of view there are two main types of city-state culture: (3a) in some cases the city-states are scattered over a country and interaction is mainly by land. (3b) In other cases the cities are located along the coasts and interaction between city-states is mainly by sea. (3c) Some city-state cultures are mixed.[64]

(4) City-state cultures emerge in one of the three

following ways: (4a) In a period of demographic and economic upsurge, urbanisation and state formation take place simultaneously or in close sequence. The city-state period is preceded by a pre-state period. The formation of city-states is gradual and often imperceptible. (4b) Colonisation of a region takes the form of the foundation of a number of city-states. (4c) In a period of decline, an urbanised macro-state disintegrates in such a way that each of its major urban centres becomes a city-state.[65]

(5) The city-states within a city-state culture vary considerably in size, both geographically and demographically, but none is so powerful that it can conquer the others permanently and transform the region into one political unit.[66] See, however, no. 9 *infra*.

(6) War between city-states is endemic,[67] but at the same time there is always considerable economic, religious and cultural interaction, which crosses all frontiers.

(7) In time of peace, city-states interact politically by having close diplomatic relations, by concluding alliances, and by forming leagues or federations, often of a hegemonic type.

(8) Attempts to create larger political units, either peacefully or by conquest, often leads to small city-states being swallowed up by larger city-states.[68] But more often such attempts take the form of hegemonic leagues, or federations (*infra* 612-3), or "mini-empires" consisting of one large dominant city-state and a number of smaller dependent city-states[69] (*infra*, 613-4).

(9) When, occasionally, one city-state succeeds in long-term conquest of all the others, the city-state structure usually persists so that the result is a large "capital" in control of an empire made up of dependent city-states (*infra* 613-4).

(10) Thus, the city-states of a city-state culture are not necessarily "peer polities," but can be hierarchically organised systems of polities, of which some are hegemonic, some independent, and some dependencies (*infra* 606).

(11) Dependent city-states are self-governing communities, but as regards foreign policy or defence, they have either restricted independence or no independence at all, and usually they have to pay tribute and provide troops to a neighbouring overlord or a hegemonic city-state within the region, or a central government in regions in which the city-states were united in a federation (*infra* 608).

(12) In some city-state cultures a central aspect is the distinction between insiders (citizens) and outsiders (free foreigners and sometimes slaves). The citizens were conscious of being a privileged group as opposed to the others who inhabited the city and its territory.[70] In some city-state cultures this aspect seems to be absent, and in city-state cultures for which the archaeological record is the only or the principal evidence, this aspect is unverifiable.

(13) A city-state culture ceases to exist either (13a) by the (temporary) disappearance of the urban centres which, of course, is associated with the disappearance of the political structure of the cities as well;[71] or (13b): the city-state culture disappears by being conquered by a neighbouring Great Power: the city-states are transformed into cities, sometimes abruptly,[72] but sometimes the city-states are allowed to persist for some time, and the transformation from city-states to cities is slow and almost imperceptible.[73]

(14) City-state cultures often appear in neighbouring regions, and in some cases one can almost speak of clusters of city-state cultures.[74]

(15) In some cases a region is split up into city-states only once in history, but there are examples of regions which at least twice and sometimes three times in world history have been a city-state culture.[75]

The Concept of City-State

Moving from the city-state culture to the city-state I suggest, as my hypothesis, the following description of the concept of the city-state. Again, the description is a Weberian ideal type rather than a definition in the strict sense of the term.

Size. The city-state is what we today would call a specific type of micro-state[76] and its smallness concerns the size of its territory as well as its population.

Territory. There is virtually no limit to how small a city-state can be, and city-states with a territory of less than 10 km^2 are attested.[77] It is more important – and more difficult – to fix an upper limit. Essentially, a city-state's territory is the immediate hinterland of its urban centre, and a city-state which extends its frontiers beyond its immediate hinterland begins to lose one of its characteristics. Given the simple means of transportation in former times, and given the fact that a city-state is a community whose members are in close contact with one another, the maximum extent of the immediate hinterland can, ideally, be fixed at one day's walk from the urban centre = ca. 30 km.[78] The inference is that the territory of a city-state may cover ca. 3,000 km^2 max. Larger city-states are indeed attested (*infra* 602), but then they are no longer city-states to the same extent as their smaller neighbours.

Population. Very small city-states have a popula-

tion of less than 1,000 inhabitants;[79] and a few over-sized city-states surpass 100,000 inhabitants; but the typical city-state has a four-digit and a large city-state a five-digit population figure (*infra* 601). It is often said that the city-state is a face-to-face society. Insofar as that applies to the adult male members of society, that is true for small and medium-sized city-states. But in large city-states even the adult male full members are too numerous to fit what is understood by a face-to-face society.

Ethnic and political identity. By contrast with a modern nation-state, the population of a city-state has a political identity which is different from its ethnic identity. It shares its ethnic identity (language, culture, religion, history etc.) with a number of other city-states, whereas its sense of political identity (including patriotism) is primarily centred on the city-state itself rather than on smaller entities (municipalities) or larger entities (ethnically based political organisations, federations, monarchies).

Names of city-states. The name of a city-state is either identical with the name of its major urban centre, or is an ethnic derived from the name of the urban centre.[80]

Settlement pattern. Especially in middle-sized and large city-states a substantial part and sometimes even the majority of the population may have been settled in the hinterland, either nucleated in villages or dispersed in homestead farms. But in a city-state the population of the urban centre constitutes a much higher percentage of the total population than in any other type of pre-industrial community (*infra* 32 [additional note] and 614).

Urbanisation. The city-state is centred on a city (= town) which is the "central place" (*Zentralort*) of the city-state's territory and the seat of its government. Thus, a city-state has one major urban centre which may be the only nucleated settlement within the territory. If there are other nucleated settlements within the territory, they are second-order settlements. There are city-states which combine an inland urban centre with a major port. But a city-state does not normally possess more than one major urban centre,[81] which from every point of view is the central place: it is the economic, the religious, the military, and the political centre of the city-state.

Economy. Small city-states may have what is essentially a subsistence economy; but the urban centres of middle-sized and large city-states are cities in the Weberian (historical) sense of this term. Although "*Ackerbürger*" may have constituted a part of the population of even large city-states, the cities of middle-

sized and large city-states were centres "wo die ortsansässige Bevölkerung einen ökonomisch wesentlichen Teil ihres Alltagsbedarfs auf dem örtlichen Markt befriedigt, und zwar zu einem wesentlichen Teil durch Erzeugnisse, welche die ortsansässige und die Bevölkerung des nächsten Umlandes für den Absatz auf dem Markt erzeugt oder sonst erworben hat" (Weber [1921/1972] 728). Thus, specialisation of function and division of labour are essential aspects of the economy of a city-state (*infra* 602-4).

Defence. A city-state has its own army and its urban centre is often (but not necessarily) fortified.

Government. A city-state is ruled from the urban centre and bi-central or multi-central city-states are extremely rare.[82] Government is not only centralised,[83] it is also highly institutionalised. Many city-states have a republican (i.e. non-monarchical) form of government, some are even democracies, and in city-states, even in those ruled by a monarch, the percentage of the population involved in government is much higher than in other types of state.

Self-government. A city-state is a self-governing polity, but not necessarily an independent and autonomous state. It suffices that a city-state is a legislative, administrative and judicial unit and (roughly) possesses what in modern terms is called "internal sovereignty", i.e. a government which enforces a legal order within a territory over a population. Many city-states are independent, many others possess some of the powers which are commonly subsumed under the concept of "external sovereignty". But external sovereignty (= independence or autonomy) is not a necessary requirement for being a city-state. Nothing prevents a city-state from being a tributary polity or a dependency of another city-state, or of a federal central government, or of a monarch. Even (some) interference with a city-state's internal sovereignty does not necessarily undermine its identity as a city-state (*infra* 608).

Lack of self-sufficiency. In his description of the ideal *polis* Aristotle emphasises economic self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*) as an unobtainable but desirable aspect of the Hellenic *polis*.[84] Undoubtedly following Aristotle, it has become customary to include economic self-sufficiency among the defining characteristics of the city-state.[85] City-state cultures, however, are characterised by urbanisation which entails specialisation of function, division of labour, and trade, not only local trade but trade with other city-states in the region as well as with states outside the region. Thus, compared with other types of early state formation, the city-state is characterised by its *lack of*

economic self-sufficiency and by a high degree of economic interaction with its neighbours.[86]

To sum up: a city-state is a highly institutionalised and highly centralised micro-state consisting of one town (often walled) with its immediate hinterland and settled with a stratified population, of whom some are citizens, some foreigners and, sometimes, slaves. Its territory is mostly so small that the urban centre can be reached in a day's walk or less, and the politically privileged part of its population is so small that it does in fact constitute a face-to-face society. The population is ethnically affiliated with the population of neighbouring city-states, but political identity is focused on the city-state itself and based on differentiation from other city-states. A significantly large fraction of the population is settled in the town, the others are settled in the hinterland, either dispersed in farmsteads or nucleated in villages or both. The urban economy implies specialisation of function and division of labour to such an extent that the population has to satisfy a significant part of their daily needs by purchase in the city's market. The city-state is a self-governing but not necessarily an independent political unit.

What I have offered here is, as stated above, a kind of Weberian ideal type, and not a proper definition. It is, however, the plurality of descriptive criteria which enables us to draw a picture of this fascinating but almost fossil type of historic society. If forced to offer a defintion of the concepts of city-state and city-state culture my not very satisfactory suggestion would be that a city-state is a micro-state composed of one town with its immediate hinterland, and a city-state culture is a civilisation which, politically, is organised as a system of city-states.

The Isolated City-State

Which civilisations fulfil a sufficient number of these criteria so as to deserve inclusion in this investigation of city-state cultures? It is often stated that the city-state is a purely historical concept and that "there are few, if any, contemporary city-states" (Nichols & Charlton [1997] 2). By and large that is true, but not quite. In Europe there still are four micro-states which are all city-states,[87] *viz.* Andorra (470 km²; 46,000 inhabitants), Liechtenstein (160 km²; 30,000 inhabitants), Monaco (71 km²; 30,000 inhabitants), and San Marino (61 km²; 26,000 inhabitants).[88] Furthermore, Luxembourg, the smallest member of the EU (2,600 km²; 400,000 inhabitants), is essentially a large city-state. All five states possess one large urban centre

only, which is the state's capital, and in four cases the name of the state is identical with the name of the capital,[89] a fact which serves to stress the close connection between city and state. In Southeast Asia Singapore and Hong Kong (until 1998) are often described as city-states,[90] in spite of the fact that the population of these cities is 3 million and 6 million respectively. Similarly, Kuwait is called a city-state (Assiri [1990]), although it has a territory of 18,000 km² and a population of 2 million. A better example would be Brunei (5,750 km²; 220,000 inhabitants; capital: Bandar Seri Begawan) which was also a city-state in the 15th and 16th centuries (*infra* 419).

More examples can be found if we remember that, politically, the defining characteristic of a city-state is *not* independence, but self-government, and that, historically, many city-states have been member states of federations. As modern examples of dependent city-states one could mention the Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey. In Germany both Hamburg and Bremen, in some sense, may still qualify as city-states, and in both cases the official name of the state is "Freie- und Hansestadt". Similarly, a large number of the Swiss Cantons are, essentially, city-states: each is a self-governing small community of citizens who inhabit a territory consisting of a town and its hinterland; and in 13 of the 23 Cantons the name of the state is identical with the name of the capital, e.g., Schaffhausen (300 km²; 72,000 inhabitants, of whom 36,000 live in Schaffhausen, the capital).

All other modern city-states, however, are isolated. Each of them is located in the middle of a large territorial state, e.g. San Marino in Italy, or is squeezed in between large territorial states, e.g. Andorra which lies between France and Spain. What has completely disappeared from the modern world is not the city-state as such, but the city-state culture, in which a cluster of neighbouring city-states sharing the same culture interact socially and economically but remain a plurality of self-governing communities. The only surviving example of what may perhaps be called a city-state culture is, in fact, Switzerland, insofar as, internally, the basic political unit is the Canton rather than the federation.[91]

So let me reformulate my earlier question and ask which *historical* civilisations fulfill a sufficient number of these criteria to be included in our investigation of city-state cultures? Again, historical examples of isolated city-states must be treated separately. Such examples include Carchemish in Anatolia after the collapse of the Hittite empire (Hawkins [1982] 375); most of the Free German cities (the *Reichsstädte*)

from the Middle Ages until 1806 (Johanek *infra* 295-319); Ragusa (Dubrovnik) between 1358 and ca. 1700 (Carter [1972]); Harar in Ethiopia in the period 1647-1875;[92] Macau in China from 1557 to 1967 (Gunn [1996]); Sakai in Japan during the sixteenth century (Gonthier [1954] 244); Danzig 1919-39 (Kimmich [1968]), and Tanger which from 1912 to 1959 was a self-governing city-state without independence (Bonjean [1967]). But these and similar examples are outside the scope of this investigation, which concerns the city-state as an integrated part of a city-state culture. How many attestations in world history can be found of proper city-state cultures?

Attestations of City-State Cultures in World History

(1) The oldest known city-state culture is the Sumerian with Uruk, Ur and Lagash as the most prominent polities. The Sumerians were organised into city-states between ca. 3100 B.C. and 2350 B.C. when Sargon of Akkad conqured Sumer. The city-states re-appeared after the fall of the Akkadian dynasty ca. 2150 B.C., but soon after they became dominated by Ur during the Third Dynasty (2100-2000 B.C.). After the fall of the Third dynasty of Ur followed another fragmentation into city-states down to ca. 1800 B.C. (Glassner, *infra* 35-53).[93]

(2) In the third millennium there were a number of interacting city-states in Syria, notably Ebla. They were destroyed ca. 2300 B.C., but re-emerged twice as city-states, first in the Middle Bronze Age ca. 2000-1800 B.C., and second in the Early Iron Age ca. 1000 B.C. (Thuesen, *infra* 55-65).

(3) In the periods 2900-2300 B.C. and again 2000-1200 B.C. Palestine was divided into, eventually, fourteen city-states, the largest being Hazor (Strange, *infra* 67-76).

(4) In the nineteenth century, more precisely ca. 1920-1800 B.C., Assur is attested as a city-state. So far it is the only known and researched example of a city-state in Assyria (Larsen, *infra* 77-87).

(5) In the course of the second millennium B.C. a number of city-states were formed along the Phoenician coast, notably Arwad, Byblos, Sidon and Tyros in the homeland, and later Carthage, which, again, founded colonies in North Africa, Spain and western Sicily (Niemeyer, *infra* 89-115).

(6) After the collapse of the Kassite monarchy ca. 1100 B.C. southern Babylonia was invaded by Aramean and Chaldean tribes, and a number of the old Babylonian cities seem to have emerged, once again,

as self-governing city-states, especially in the 9th and 8th centuries (Larsen, *infra* 117-27).

(7) From ca. 1175 B.C. to 605 B.C the Philistines were settled in five city-states stretching from Ekron in the north to Gaza in the south (Strange, *infra* 129-39).

(8) In the period ca. 750 B.C. to ca. 550 A.D. the Mediterranean and the Pontic Region was dotted with, perhaps, some 1,500 Greek city-states (Hansen, *infra* 141-87).

(9) The Etruscan people were divided into 12 city-states (e.g. Caere, Tarquinia and Vulci) until they were absorbed by the Romans in the 3rd century B.C. (Torelli, *infra* 189-208).

(10) Rome itself was originally the largest of some twenty city-states in Latium, followed in size by Tibur and Praeneste. At the end of the Social War in 89 B.C. they had all been incorporated into the Roman State (Cornell, *infra* 209-28).

(11) Along the caravan route through western Arabia from Palestine to Aden a string of small towns emerged in the major oases. In the 5th and 6th centuries A.D. the most prominent was Mecca. All these caravan towns were independent communities and may be described as forming a nascent city-state culture which, however, disappeared in the course of the 7th century concurrently with the Islamic conquest of the Middle East (Bæk Simonsen, *infra* 241-9).

(12) Vikings, most of them Norwegian, colonised the east coast of Ireland in the early 10th century and founded several towns, notably Dublin. These so-called Hiberno-Viking towns were organised as city-states which soon became dependent city-states under Irish kings and eventually were conquered by England in 1171 (Holm, *infra* 251-62).

(13) City-states emerged in Northern Italy ca. 1100 A.D., and a century later the region was fragmented into some 300 city-states with Florence, Milan and Venice vying for primacy. Around 1400 A.D. these large city-states had swallowed up most of the small neighbouring city-states and were thereby transformed from city-states into small "territorial" states (Epstein, *infra* 277-93).

(14) Whereas the German "imperial cities" and "free cities" were city-states but did not constitute a proper city-state culture (Johanek, *infra* 295-319), the eight Swiss free cities were self-governing political units which were sufficiently interrelated to form a city-state culture from the 14th century until 1848 (Stercken, *infra* 321-42).

(15) The Dutch Republic, created in 1579 by the Union of Utrecht, was organised as a confederation of

seven provinces, each composed of a number of self-governing cities. The Union can reasonably be conceived as a federation of fifty-seven dependent city-states in all (Prak, *infra* 343-58).

(16) In China the Zhou monarchy collapsed in 771 B.C. and the state was broken up into several hundred micro-states, of which most were city-states. During the Spring-and-Autumn period of Chinese history (771-481 B.C.) the city-state was the basic political unit in Central China, but more and more city-states were swallowed up by the neighbouring macro-states, and in the Warring States period virtually all the city-states disappeared for good (Lewis, *infra* 359-73).

(17) In Central Asia the Silk Road passed north or south of the Tarim Basin and here, on the fringes of the Taklamakan desert, lay forty-seven small states of which some twenty-five were city-states. They emerged ca. 200 B.C. and persisted as city-states until ca. 1800 A.D. In some periods they were independent, but mostly they were dependent city-states dominated by the Chinese or the Tibetan or the Mongol empire (Di Cosmo, *infra* 393-407).

(18) From the 7th to the 11th centuries A.D. Sriwijaya in southern Sumatra seems to have been a hegemonic Malay city-state controlling a number of dependent city-states in the region (Manguin, *infra* 409-16).

(19) In the same region there are the Southeast Asian maritime cities, e.g. Melaka, Aceh and Brunei, called *negeri*, a Sanskrit word for city which has passed into modern Malay in the sense of state (Reid [1980] 235-40). Between ca. 1450 and 1625 they were self-governing urban communities, all belonging to what can reasonably called a city-state culture (Reid, *infra* 417-29).

(20) Apart from the Malay city-states there were in the neighbouring region other related city-states whose inhabitants communicated in Thai, Javanese and Makassarese (Connor, *infra* 431-43).

(21) We find city-states in Africa in the northern part of the Sahara where the Mzâb, a splinter community of Berbers, in the 11th century set up first five, later seven city-states that survived until the French occupation in 1882 (Jaabiri & Yahia, *infra* 445-62).

(22) Along the east coast of Africa, in southern Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and nothern Mozambique, are the remains of a string of stone towns, inhabited by Swahili-speaking people. They emerged before 1000 A.D. and persisted as independent or at least autonomous city-states until the early 19th century. All the polities were interconnected and they can thus

be classified as a city-state culture (Sinclair & Håkansson, *infra* 463-82).

(23) South of the Sahara and east of the Niger, on the vast pastoral plain, the Hausa were organized into seven large and several smaller city-states between ca. 1450 and 1804 (Griffeth, *infra* 483-506).

(24) The highest level of pre-colonial urbanisation in Africa is found in Yorubaland south and west of the Niger river. From ca. 1600-1900 many of these cities (*ilu*) were city-states; and during the 17th century one of them, Oyo, subjected a number of neighbouring *ilu* and created what can be seen as a kind of city-state empire (Peel, *infra* 507-17).

(25) On the Gold Coast, in modern Ghana, the Fante were settled in a number of city-states. They emerged in the 14th-16th centuries, and flourished in the 17th-18th centuries when they were organised into a federation of allied and rival city-states dominated by Mankessim. In the beginning of the 19th century their federation was destroyed by the Asante (Kea, *infra* 519-30).

(26) In the course of the Middle Ages the region south of Lake Chad became urbanised and split up into more than a dozen small city-state principalities. From ca. 1600 they were subjected to the Bornu empire but still self-governing polities organised into two small federations of city-states (Hansen, *infra* 531-2).

(27) From ca. 1600 to 1800 the Niger Delta region was divided between four city-states which were centres of the Atlantic trade in slaves in West Africa (Princewill, *infra* 533-45).

(28) The decipherment of the Maya hieroglyphs combined with recent archaeological research has confirmed that the Maya of the classical period (ca. 250-900 A.D.) were organised into some 30 city-states. They all disappeared in the course of the 9th century, but after the collapse of Mayapan ca. 1450 A.D. Yucatan was once again split up into small kingdoms which can reasonably be described as city-states (Grube, *infra* 547-65).

(29) In the post-classical period (ca. 900-1521 A.D.), the Mixteca region, which lies to the northwest of the Maya, was split up into over 100 city-states. They formed a separate city-state culture which persisted to the end of the 16th century, but from ca. 1450 the Mixtec city-states were dependencies of first the Aztecs and then the Spaniards (Lind, *infra* 567-80). ·

(30) In central Mexico "the arrival of Aztec migrants in the 12th century was accompanied by the immediate establishment of city-states" which lasted

until sometime after the Spanish conquest in 1519-21 (Smith, *infra* 581-95).

The above list as well as the title of this book indicate that I believe I have identified thirty different city-state cultures. The number thirty, however, must not be taken too seriously. The Babylonian city-states of the first half of the first millennium B.C. are described separately from the earlier Sumerian city-states. But in Sumer, in Western Syria, and in Palestine, city-state cultures disappeared and re-emerged after a shorter or longer period. Only one chapter is devoted to Western Syria and one to Palestine. If each city-state period is counted separately we would have as many more city-state cultures. Conversely, city-states in Tuscany are treated first in the chapter about the Etruscan city-states and then again in the chapter about the Italian city-states. In this case there can be no doubt that we have to do with two different city-state cultures. But one should perhaps apply a similar approach to the Maya civilisation and describe the city-states of the Classical Period as belonging to one city-state culture, and the city-states of the period 1450-1600 as belonging to another one.

A different issue is the identification of neighbouring and closely related city-state cultures. Thus, in West Africa in modern Ghana there were three or four different city-state cultures: Fante, Akwamu, Asante and, possibly, Denkyira. This volume includes a chapter about the Fante (Kea, *infra* 519-30). The others have not yet been studied from this particular point of view, and the Akwamu and Denkyira have hardly been investigated from any point of view.[94] Similarly, in Southeast Asia the Thai, Malay, Javanese, and Makassarese maritime city-states can be treated as four different city-state cultures (see Reid, *infra* 419) of which only the Malay and Thai are treated in this volume.

Finally, the precise identification of what constitutes a city-state culture is always a matter of definition. Whenever one attempts to match a concept with its denotata the perennial problem is where to draw the line between inclusion and exclusion, see *infra* 600. Thus, the urban settlements along the caravan route in Western Arabia were small towns, but it is debatable whether they were states and so city-states. They have been included here, but only hesitatingly. Again, the fifty-seven towns which made up the Dutch Republic can reasonably be described as dependent city-states but in many important respects they were different from, e.g., the ancient Greek dependent *poleis* which made up the Boiotian or the Lycian confederacy.

Civilisations Resembling City-State Cultures

Next there are possible examples of city-state cultures which I have left out because the evidence is insufficient. One such example is *Middle Bronze Age Crete*. It is still a moot point whether Crete during the New Palace Period was one state with five major palatial centres, or was split up into five small states each centred on a palace. John Cherry has argued that the second alternative is preferable and that the five "states" were "peer polities" (Cherry [1986]). The decipherment of the Linear A script, if ever made, may solve the problem. Again, habitation centres have been found near the palaces so that they seem to have been palatial cities rather than just royal residences (Knappett [1999], describing Malia in the Old Palace Period). If Cherry and Knappett are right, the inference is that Crete was the home of a city-state culture already in the Bronze Age. As the evidence stands the answer is a *non liquet*.

Other civilisations share some of the above characteristics, but not enough to be considered city-state cultures in the true sense.

(1) The Celtic *oppida* in central Europe between the 6th and the 1st century B.C. were sizable and sometimes planned urban centres. They may also have been centres of states, but not of city-states (Collis, *infra* 229-39).

(2) The Viking "city-states" in southern Russia between ca. 850 and 1050, principally Novgorod and Kiev, did not constitute a city-state culture, and it is highly problematical whether they can be described as city-states (Price, *infra* 263-75).

(3) In medieval and early modern Germany some four to five score of *Reichsstädte* and a few "free cities" were dotted about amongst the principalities and episcopal states, but they were not gathered together in a single continuous region with adjoining territories and were, in principle, imperial cities. A cluster of imperial cities was found only in medieval Swabia, and here they did form an urban league from the late 14th century onwards.[95] Politically the free and imperial cities are best described as being dependent city-states, and in some periods they can even be described as virtually independent city-states. But they did not constitute one city-state culture. They did not interact as a separate network; and many of them had closer affinities with neighbouring "territorial" towns (i.e. towns ruled by princes) than with other imperial cities. Thus, of all the members of the Hanseatic League, only a few, including Lübeck, were free im-

perial towns, the majority were "territorial towns" (Johanek, *infra* 295-319).

(4) Finally, in the Early Historic Period, that is ca. 800-200 B.C., India was broken up into a number of urbanised states, some of them republican. Buddhist and Jaina sources list sixteen such states, called maha-janapadas. Modern historians sometimes describe them as city-states (Kenoyer [1997] 63-8). The frag-mentation into political units, however, is based on some kind of tribal system, not on urban centres; in no case is the name of the state identical with the name of its capital; and even the smallest of them is much too big to fit the description of a city-state outlined above (Chakrabarti, *infra* 375-91).

Since types of society do not always fall into well-defined categories but, invariably, constitute a continuum, I have in this volume included chapters about the four above examples, *viz.* the Celtic *oppida*, the Viking cities in Russia, the German *Reichsstädte*, and the Indian *mahajanapadas*.

So, this investigation comprises over thirty civilisa-tions, of which some have frequently been adduced as examples whenever the city-state model is discussed, i.e. the Sumerian, the Greek and the Italian city-states. But many are hardly ever mentioned in this context, e.g. the Vikings in Ireland, the Mzâb cities in central Sahara, the Malay city-states, the city-states in the Tarim basin, and the Mixtec city-states.

Civilisations Excluded from the Investigation

Conversely, there are some civilisations which I have excluded, although they are sometimes described as having been organised into city-states, *viz.*, (1) Pre-dynastic Egypt. (2) Early Bronze Age Anatolia. (3) The Harappan phase of the Indus Valley civilisation. (4) Some of the small *taifa* states in Andalusia in the 11th century A.D. (5) The consulate cities in southern France in the 12th to 14th centuries A.D. (6) The Flemish cities in the late Middle Ages. This introduc-tion is, in my opinion, the proper place to explain why I have expunged them from the Polis Centre's investi-gation of city-state cultures.

(1) Pre-dynastic Egypt. As stated above there can no longer be any doubt that ancient Egypt was an ur-banised civilisation. More and more nucleated centres can be traced back to the Early Dynastic Period, and some centres in Upper Egypt even to the Predynastic Period, in particular Nagada, Hierakonpolis and Ele-phantine (Kemp [1990] 138-49, 159-78, 202). The theory has been advanced that the proto-kingdom of

Upper Egypt was split up into "incipient city-states"; and in conformity with this theory archaeologists and historians begin, in a political context, to refer to this period as "Dynasty 0" (Kemp [1990] 44, 46, 50). However, compared with the evidence from lower Mesopotamia the remains of pre-dynastic Egyptian towns are not very impressive, and furthermore, we possess virtually no information about the political organisation of these predynastic urban centres.[96] Nothing prevents us from assuming that these towns, like the towns in early medieval Scandinavia, grew up simultaneously with or even slightly later than state formation and that no city-state period preceded a centralised monarchical government. Future discoveries may well change the picture, but, as the evidence stands, I prefer to leave out Egypt in a com-parative study of city-state cultures.

(2) Early Bronze Age Anatolia. It is sometimes stated that before the rise of Hattusas, i.e. in the late third and early second millennium B.C., Anatolia was a land of small city-states, each centred on a fortified city containing a palace. The most prominent were Kanesh, Wahshushana, Purushhattum and Kussara. They may perhaps have formed a city-state culture with first Purushhattum and later Kussara as the hege-monic city-state and several others as dependent city-states (Kuhrt [1995] 225-9; Macqueen [1996] 18, 75-6). We are virtually ignorant of the political system of these so-called city-states, and they seem to have been small or middle-sized macro-states rather than proper city-states conforming to the description set out above. I shall not deny that in future studies it might be worth-while to include Anatolia before the Hittite empire as the home of a city-state culture, but as the evidence stands I prefer to leave out Pre-Hittite Anatolia from the present study of city-state cultures.[97]

(3) The Harappan phase of the Indus Valley Civilisation. During the period ca. 2600-1900 B.C. the Indus valley was inhabited by a highly urbanised people. The current view is that the region was sub-divided into five city-states, each with a large urban centre dominating a territory dotted with smaller towns and villages (Kenoyer [1997] 51-63). The five major towns were Harappa, Mohenjo-daro, Ganweri-wala, Rakhigarhi and Dholavira. They were walled and the area enclosed by the walls ranged from over 50 to over 200 ha. The habitation areas show traces of an irregular grid network. Remains of workshops have been found in the excavated sectors, and they testify to a considerable division of labour and spe-cialisation of function. Due to the lack of regional studies the hinterland of each of these five cities can-

not be calculated with any exactitude, but by using the Thiessen polygonales and by leaving out uninhabitable areas, the territories of the cities seem to range from approximately 100,000 km² to 170,000 km² (Kenoyer [1997] 54; [1998] 100). Thus, the smallest is larger than Portugal, and the largest is larger than England and about the size of the three Baltic states combined! According to the above description of the concept, they are much too large to be city-states. There can be no doubt that the Indus valley in this period developed one of the most advanced urban cultures of the ancient world. I have no problem with taking the towns to be both proper cities and centres of proper states. But the classification of them as city-states is incompatible with the model adopted in this volume.[98]

(4) The *taifa* states in Andalusia in the 11th century A.D. With the collapse of the Spanish caliphate in 1009, Al-Andalus was fragmented into seven larger and some score of very small states, each centered on a city.[99] They are usually called *taifas*, and it is sometimes held that they were "city-states", not only the small ones but also the large *taifas* such as Zaragoza, Toledo, Cordoba and Seville.[100] Admittedly, some of the smallest *taifa* states consisted of just one town plus its immediate hinterland, and for a short period they were not only self-governing but even independent political units. Examples are Alpuente, Carmona and Moron. But they were squeezed in between their larger neighbours. They may for a short period have been isolated city-states, but did not form what can be called a city-state culture. Thus, Moron and Carmona were conquered by Seville in, respectively, 1058 and 1066. The large *taifas*, on the other hand, were much too large to function as proper city-states. Seville controlled a territory of over 10,000 km²; that of Zaragoza was more than twice as large, and Toledo's territory covered some 90,000 km².[101]

(5) The consulate cities in Southern France in the 12th to 14th centuries. The origins of the Italian city-states can be traced back to ca. 1100 A.D. when elected consuls replaced the bishop as the most important jurisdictional power in many North Italian cities (Epstein, *infra* 279-80). A few decades later a similar development took place in Southern France: in some cities some of the seigneurial rights were taken over by elected consuls. Such cities are commonly called *villes de consulat* and together with the *villes de commune* they are opposed to cities ruled by a feudal lord. Consulate cities are found everywhere in le Midi, but their heartland was Provence and Languedoc, and the most prominent were Nimes, Mar-

seille, Arles, Avignon, and Toulouse. The first consuls emerged around 1130. The institution is still attested in some cities in the 16th century, but from the mid 14th century onwards urban self-government had everywhere become so restricted that all the consulate cities must be described as mere municipalities. Thus, the period to be discussed in this context is ca. 1130-ca. 1350.

During this period of slightly over two centuries the consulate cities obtained a considerable amount of self-government in legislation, administration of justice, taxation and defence. Occasionally, a consulate city was even empowered to conclude treaties with other cities and with neighbouring feudal lords. The institutions in possession of these powers were (a) a board of consuls (numbering from two to twenty-four), (b) an advisory council (numbering from twelve to over a hundred), and (c) a general assembly (of middle and/or upper-class citizens and hardly ever comprising all inhabitants). The political system was at first aristocratic but later more oligarchic as merchants and artisans succeeded in acquiring full political rights. The general assembly was summoned only occasionally, and the consuls were the pivot of the system. They were sometimes appointed by the city's feudal overlord, but mostly elected or appointed by co-optation. Jurisdiction was their most important sphere of influence, often contested between the consuls and their overlord.

Are the French consulate cities city-states? and, if they are, do they constitute a city-state culture? I am inclined to answer in the negative.[102] First, like the German free and imperial cities, the consulate cities were scattered and lay between fiefs ruled by counts and bishops. Thus, even if some of them may be classified as city-states, they did not constitute a city-state culture, as did the Swiss or the North Italian cities. Second, unlike the German free and imperial cities the consulate cities were an integral part of the feudal system. All were vassals with a count or a bishop as their feudal lord, and several had vassals for whom the city was the feudal lord. The French consulate cities resembled the German territorial cities: many of them possessed a large amount of self-government, they were certainly what Weber calls *Stadtgemeinden*, but very few acquired full internal sovereignty and even fewer a share of external sovereignty. They were self-governing cities, but not polities as were the North Italian city-states. The best indication of the difference in this respect between a consulate city and an Italian city-state is probably the ideology. A reader of Italian political treatises from Bartolo de Sassoferato

to Machiavelli is never left in doubt that the *città* they describe are seen as polities and not just as municipal communities. To the best of my knowledge, there is no similar evidence that the consulate cities were conceived or thought of themselves as being polities.[103]

(6) The medieval Flemish cities. For similar reasons I have excluded the medieval Flemish cities, such as Bruges, Ghent, and Antwerp. They are sometimes adduced in connection with the concept of city-state (Blockmans [1994] 228); "but contrary to the Italians, the urban elites of the Low Countries never established independent states in their own right. Instead, their towns were integrated into a feudal structure of representation, and had to share power with regional lords (the Duke of Brabant, the Counts of Flanders and Holland, and so on), as well as the ecclesiastical and aristocratic estates" (Prak, *infra* 344).

This book, I believe, is the largest comparative study to date of systems of city-states, and, to the best of my knowledge, it is the first one in which an attempt has been made to apply the concepts of city-state and city-state culture as consistently as possible. One consequence of this method is that I have excluded some civilisations traditionally adduced as examples of city-states, principally the Indian cities of the Harappan phase and the Medieval German *Reichsstädte*. Conversely, it is my hope that this study includes all the major city-state cultures in world history. It is most unlikely, however, that I have succeeded in finding all attestations of this peculiar form of state formation. I have to confess ignorance of how many more examples I could have found by reading deeper into the historical literature. And I am equally ignorant of how many more can be found by historians, archaeologists, and anthropologists who happen to be persuaded by the present volume and become convinced that its key concepts can reasonably be applied to other civilisations not yet studied from this particular point of view.

Appendix 1
The Terms Town and City

There is, alas, no proper study of the terms "city" and "town", and the question of how to distinguish a city from a town is a neglected issue. In historical contexts the two terms are used synonymously and indiscriminately by all scholars. Thus, in the preface to West (1983) xiv, the word town is used to cover cities like York and Bristol. And in the section "Is There a Law

Governing the Size of Cities?" Bairoch (1988) 146 writes: "the size of the various towns is a direct function of the size of the largest among them ... the size of the second city is that of the largest divided by two,... ".

Traditionally, a "city" has been a "cathedral town" and/or a town which was made a city by Royal letter. In the *Encyclopedie* 3 (1753) s.v. "cité" 486 Diderot noticed that "on n'appela *cité* que les villes épiscopales; cette distinction ne subsiste plus guerre qu'en Angleterre, ..." But the *Oxford English Dictionary* 3: 252 s.v. "city" has the following note: "Historians and legal antiquaries have, however, always pointed out that there is no necessary connexion of 'city' with 'cathedral town', and in recent times the style and rank of "city" have begun to be conferred by royal authority on large and important boroughs which are not episcopal seats, Birmingham being the first so distinguished in England [in 1889] ... In North America [city] usually connotes municipal autonomy or organization of a more complete or higher kind than 'town'". In contemporary English "city" just connotes "a large and important town" (*Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* [4th edn. 1989] 203), and seems to denote nucleated settlements with at least a five-digit number of inhabitants. Whitaker's *Almanac* (1993) 531-7 has a list of 29 "principal cities" of which the largest is Birmingham with 934,900 inhabitants. Most of the others have more than 100,000 inhabitants and the two smallest are Lincoln (with 81,900 inhabitants) and Durham (with 85,000 inhabitants). For a list of European pre-industrial cities with a population of at least 10,000 inhabitants see de Vries (1981) 79-109.

Appendix 2
Ankole as an Example of a State without Urbanisation

Ankole was one of over twenty Bantu-speaking kingdoms east of Lake Victoria in what is now Uganda.[104] The population is split into in a small pastoral elite, the *Hima*, superimposed over a large agricultural population, the *Iru*, which comprised over 90% of the total population. The *Iru* farmers are the original population. The *Hima* nomads immigrated before 1500 and set up the *Hinda* dynasty which ruled Ankole until all the Bantu kingdoms were abolished by the Uganda constitution of 1967.

Ankole had a highly centralised political system centred on the king, *Mugabe*. The *Mugabe* was the supreme authority and the symbol of his powers was

the cult of the royal drums, the *Bagyendenwa*. The *Mugabe* was, strictly speaking, above the law. He made all appointments, decided on war and peace, and could impose taxes. He was the supreme judicial authority who had the right to punish individuals by death, exile, beating, torture, and cursing. The *Mugabe* was supported by a large number of officials: his mother and sister, his favourite chief, the *Enganzi*, and a group of *abagaragwa*, or king's relatives; furthermore there were executive chiefs, or *abakungu*, comprising war leaders and tribute collectors. At least since the mid-19th century the whole system of government was unquestionably at state level, but not linked to any urban centre. The residence of the *Mugabe* was the large prestigious royal kraal, known as the *orurembo* and made up of a number of enclosures. Like the European kings of the Middle Ages, the *Mugabe* moved around the country all the time. The farmers were settled in semi-autonomous villages[105] and had accepted the suzerainty of the *Hima* aristocracy and the *Hinda* dynasty. Only at the village level was *Iru* political participation permitted.

There can be no doubt that it is the mixture of a pastoral with an agricultural economy which lies behind Ankole's peculiar political structure. But, whatever the reason, 18th – and especially 19th – century Ankole was an unquestionable example of a state without towns. And furthermore, the entire political system was in the hands of the basically nomadic sector of the population.

Appendix 3
The Yakö as an Example of a Stateless Urbanised Society

The Yakö are a small people living in SE Nigeria.[106] At the beginning of the 20th century they numbered some 30,000 persons and inhabited a territory of ca. 600 km². They were settled in five compact villages a few kilometers apart, each of which was formally independent. There were no centralised political organisations, and wars between the villages were still remembered. The smallest village is Idomi, which in the 1930s had close to 2,000 inhabitants. The largest is Umor, which then had a population of close to 11,000 inhabitants and controlled a territory of slightly over 100 km². The inhabitants were farmers who all lived in the village and walked to their fields. But every household produced some surplus, especially palm-oil and palm-kernels. Some of the surplus was produced for export, some of it was disposed of by sale in the village market.

The social organisation of the villages was based on a complicated network of overlapping groups, some of which were principally territorial, whereas some were based on kinship. Each village was subdivided into wards with clearly marked boundaries between the wards. Each ward had an assembly place for meetings, rites and festivals. Thus Umor was subdivided into originally five, later four wards. Each ward was inhabited by a number of localised patriclans (sing. *kepun*, pl. *yepun*) varying in size from 50 to 200 men. Each patriclan controlled its own dwelling area within the ward. There was no tribal superstructure above the patriclan. Each ward had an association of leaders (Yakambən), the head of which (Ogbolia) claimed authority over both ritual and secular affairs. The ward was almost a self-governing community, and fighting between two wards in Umor had resulted in emigration of all members of one ward and the subsequent foundation by that ward of a new village.

But apart from the four wards and their patriclans there are in Umor 23 differently organised matriclans (sing. *lejima*, pl. *yajima*) which provided a village corporation of priests known simply as the heads (Yabot). Apart from the priests the Yabot also comprised some "officials" e.g. Yabot Leko and the Yanun Eko, two war leaders who formerly conducted rituals to secure success in warfare. The head of the village (Obot Lopon) was the priest of the premier matriclan spirit and the custodian of its shrine. The village head had his house in the centre of the village next to a meeting place where all villagers meet. The leaders of the wards were not subordinate to the leaders of the village. Both sets of institutions were involved in decision-making and the settling of disputes, but both lacked secular means of enforcing their decisions and they did not possess any administrative machinery for carrying out their decisions.

Are the Yakö of the 19th and early 20th centuries a possible example of a city-state culture? The nucleated centres are, traditionally, called "villages", but they are indisputably large enough to be cities in the Weberian sense, and in recent studies they are indeed labelled "towns" (McIntosh [1995] 397). The inhabitants are, primarily, farmers who live in the nucleated settlement. But, according to Weber, such *Ackerbürger* are an integrated part of many early cities. Although the Yakö practised what was to a large extent a subsistence economy, the widespread production of a surplus either exported or sold in the market was presumably of sufficient importance to justify the classification of the five nucleated Yakö centres as "Weberian" cities in the economic sense. Much more prob-

lematic is the political organisation of these urban centres. The political organisation of the towns was different from what we find in a proper city-state culture. The coexistence of two different forms of political organisation which were virtually independent of one another, and the lack of centralised institutions empowered to enforce a legal order are important characteristics which militate against describing the Yakö urban centres as proper states. Nor can any concept of citizenship be traced. In conclusion, I accept the scholarly consensus that the Yakö lived in what can reasonably be called urban centres but without any political organisation of the people as a whole, and with a political organisation of the five urban centres which lacked the essential characteristics of statehood.

Notes

1. Childe (1958) 34-42; Champion *et alii* (1984); Barker (1985).
2. Price (1995) 131-4; Hvass & Storgaard (1993).
3. Development of agriculture and population growth go hand in hand, and I find it superfluous in this context to discuss whether, originally, population pressure was the cause and agriculture the effect as suggested by Boserup (1965) 117-20, or whether population growth was the result of agricultural intensification as argued by Renfrew (1972) 304.
4. Before the neolithic revolution the population density is estimated at less than one person per square mile. On the Pacific Islands neolithic societies today attain a density of 30 or more persons to the square mile: Childe (1950) 4.
5. On settlement patterns in general, see Roberts (1996); Tringham (1972) xix-xxviii; Blouet (1972) 3-15. On the distinction between nucleated and dispersed settlement, see Roberts (1996) 15-37. For an example, see Cherry, Davis & E. Mantzourani (1991) 457-79.
6. Rowley-Conwy (1986) 25, mentioning Lepenski Vir in the Donau region and the Ertebølle culture. The mesolithic village at Lepenski Vir consisted of between 20 and 26 houses in the period from ca. 5800 B.C. to ca. 4600 B.C. (Ristic [1980]); Srejović (1972).
7. For a historical example, see Foxhall (1997) 257-68. A modern example is Denmark in the 19th and 20th centuries.
8. Childe (1950); Trigger (1972) 579-82. For the link between agriculture and urbanisation, see Murdock (1969) 129-50. In an investigation of 322 societies Murdock shows that 56% of societies practising intensive agriculture have cities of over 50,000 inhabitants, a further 9% have towns of over 5,000 inhabitants, whereas only 18.5% of the societies are settled in villages of max. 200 persons.
9. Thus, in Denmark 5,000 years passed between the development of agriculture ca. 4,000 B.C (*supra* n. 2) and the emergence of proper towns in the 11th century A.D. (*infra* n. 50).
10. The "dogma" that agriculture preceded cities was attacked by Jacobs (1969). For a refutation of her views, see Bairoch (1988) 13-5 and Mieroop (1997) 25-6. Let me add, however, that Ian Hodder's ongoing excavations do not support the current view of Çatal Hüyük as a predominantly agricultural

society. Remains of animal bones suggest that both wild and domestic variants were present. The Archaeobotanical analyses of the diet point to a regular wild plant component whereas there is little evidence for bread and other ground foods. See http://catal.arch.cam.ac.uk, 1998.
11. For the meaning and reference of the terms 'town' and 'city' see Appendix, 1 *infra* 25.
12. A term coined by Breasted (1916) 100-101. The Fertile Crescent comprises Mesopotamia, Eastern Turkey, Syria and Palestine.
13. Wheatley (1971) 9, 225-370. Wheatley assumes seven pristine urban cultures, listing Egypt and Mesopotamia as independent of one another, but for contacts between the two civilisations, see Kemp (1989) 92.
14. Mellaart (1967); Mieroop (1975) 26.
15. Defence circuit, stone houses and sanctuaries from ca. 6,800 B.C. The town covered an area of ca. 2.5 ha and was inhabited by, probably, some 500-1,000 persons, see Bar-Yosef (1992) 10-39.
16. Stein (1998) 21-2, 46-7: "By 3500 B.C. Mehrgarh covered 75 hectares."
17. Theocharis (1973) and excavation reports in *Praktika* (1972) 8-11, (1973) 22-5, (1976) 153-62, (1977) 159-61.
18. In *Archiv von Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 47 (1921) 621-772, republished as Chapter 8 of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen 5th edn. 1972) 727-814 (the edn. I quote here). For the impact and importance of Max Weber for later urban studies see, e.g., Sjöberg (1960) 3-4; Nippel (1991) 19-30. – Meier (1994) is focused on the city as a community and has no treatment of the city as an urban centre.
19. Spencer (1885) 449-50; Naroll (1956) 690; Morris (1991) 38-40.
20. The model developed by Gordon Childe (1950) 9-16 includes Weber's essential characteristics, but adds some others: His ten indices are: (1) the concentration of a relatively large number of people in a restricted area; (2) craft specialisation; (3) the appropriation by a central authority of an economic surplus; (4) monumental public architecture; (5) developed social stratification; (6) the use of writing; (7) the emergence of sciences; (8) naturalistic art; (9) foreign trade; (10) group membership based on residence rather than kinship. It is worth remembering, especially re (6), that Childe developed this model before the discovery of Jericho and Çatal Hüyük, and without taking the Inca towns into account. – Gideon Sjöberg's definition of a city owes much to Weber but he follows Childe in making literacy a defining characteristic: "The term 'city' has been utilised in varying fashions. We see it, in contrast to a town or a village, as having greater size, density, and heterogeneity and including a wide range of non-agricultural specialists, most significant of whom are the literati" (Sjöberg [1960] 11). – Heterogeneity includes Weber's division of labour and specialisation of function. According to Paul Bairoch (1988) 8: "most writers have insisted that one or more of the following five conditions must be met: (1) The existence of full-time craftsmen, furnishing evidence of a division of labor. (2) The existence of fortifications or walled enclosures, thus distinguishing the city or town from the village, which remains open. (3) A population of sufficient size and, above all, density. (4) A specifically urban habitat; houses built of durable materials, habitations arranged so as to form streets, and so forth. (5) Permanent settlements, as opposed to transient encampments." A recent archaeological contribution to the

discussion is that of Bietak, who lists nine criteria: (1) Highly concentrated settlement of some size; (2) compact form of settlement; (3) differentiated internal pattern of settlement; (4) centre of a district in administration, commerce, jurisdiction and traffic; (5) not a farming community, although a part of its population may be agriculturalists; (6) concentration of industries, crafts, goods and stores; (7) partition in labour, professions, and social hierarchy; (8) a town may be a religious centre; (9) centre of refuge and defence (Bietak [1979]) 103). See also Scarre & Fagan (1997) 6.

A completely different approach is to give up all attempts to define a town functionally and, to state, e.g., that "a 'town' is defined here in its widest sense as a collection of houses greater than a village" (Sinclair [1993] 22).

21. See, e.g., Dyson (1987) 590-3. For a survey of this view of the state, see Hansen (1998) 35-51, 107-13, 114-16.

22. For "the Westphalian Model" as it is often called, see, e.g., Held (1995) 77ff. For a critique of the model, see Hansen (1998) 112-13. The 189 states are the 187 members of the UN plus Switzerland and the Vatican City. East Timor will probably be no. 190. Taiwan and North Cyprus are states *de facto*, but not (yet) *de jure*.

23. To illustrate this very important point it suffices, I think, to quote one leading scholar in political science, David Easton, and one in political philosophy, Carl Schmitt.
Easton (1971) 109. "The territorial state as we have known it since the Treaty of Westphalia has thus become the prototype from which the criteria for all political systems are derived. But prior to the seventeenth century, for the vast span of time in which men lived and governed one another, according to this interpretation of the state at least, no state was in existence. At most there was a truncated form of political life. Greece had its city-community, mistranslated today as the city-state....".
Schmitt (1941) 376: "Noch heute hört man statt von der griechischen Polis oder von der römischen Republik vom "antiken Staat" der Griechen und Römer, statt vom Reich vom "deutschen Staat des Mittelalters" und gar von den Staaten der Araber, Türken oder Chinesen sprechen. Eine durchaus zeitgebundene, geschichtlich bedingte, konkrete und spezifische Organisationsform der politischen Einheit verliert auf diese Weise ihren geschichtlichen Ort und ihren typischen Inhalt; sie wird in irreführender Abstraktheit auf gänzlich verschiedene Zeiten und Völker übertragen und in völlig andersartige Gebilde und Organisationen hineinprojiziert. Diese Erhebung des Staatsbegriffes zum allgemeinen Normalbegriff der politischen Organisationsform aller Zeiten und Völker wird wahrscheinlich mit dem Zeitalter der Staatlichkeit selbst bald ein Ende nehmen. Sie kommt aber auch heute noch vor, und deshalb sei hier der konkret-geschichtliche und spezifische Charakter des Staatsbegriffes als einer an das 16. bis 20. Jahrhundert europäischer Geschichte gebundenen, politischen Ordnungsvorstellung von Anfang an ausser Zweifel gestellt".
The historical inaccuracy and the theoretical fallacy of this view are pointed out in Hansen (1998) 107-16. For a comparison of the concepts of state and *polis*, emphasising both differences and similarities, see Hansen (1998) 117-23.

24. Kelsen (1946) 207; Verdross & Simma (1984) 224-5; Doehring (1987) 424; Oppenheim (1992) 121-2; Maurer (1999) 3-4 = § 6-9.

25. Krader (1968) 7-10; Claessen & Skalník (1978) 1-107; Finer (1997) 2-15.

26. Middleton & Tait (1964); Service (1971); Crone (1986). On Chiefdoms, see Earle (1997). For a Marxist view of the transition from chiefdom to state, see Kristiansen (1991).

27. Weber (1921/1972) 821-2; Krader (1968) 11-28; Claessen & Skalník (1978) 17-22; Southall (1953) 248-9; Balandier (1972) 123-57.

28. Balandier (1972) 140-3. Crone (1986) 57. However, for co-existence of tribes and state, see Southall (1953) 257.

29. Crone (1986) 50, 64, 68.

30. Shift from the tribe based on kinship to the state based on "local contiguity" was first emphasised by Henry Maine (1861/1959) 76.

31. Claessen & Skalník (1978) 21, 33, 85, 544-9; Fried (1960) 713-31. For the origin of this view see, e.g., Engels (1866) 301-2: "Im Staate stellt sich uns die erste ideologische Macht über den Menschen dar. Die Gesellschaft schafft sich ein Organ zur Wahrung ihrer gemeinsamen Interessen gegenüber inneren und äusseren Angriffen. Dies Organ ist die Staatsgewalt. Kaum entstanden, verselbständigt sich dies Organ gegenüber der Gesellschaft, und zwar um so mehr, je mehr es Organ einer bestimmten Klasse wird, die Herrschaft dieser Klasse direkt zur Geltung bringt." The "classical" Marxist account of this view of the state is in Lenin (1917) Chapter 2, with numerous quotations from Engels' works, especially, of course, from *Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats* (1884).

32. Hinsley (1986), Oppenheim (1992) 120; see Hansen (1998) 42-6.

33. Skinner (1978) II 353. See Hansen (1998) 40-2.

34. See Radcliffe-Brown (1940) xxiii: "In writings on political institutions there is a good deal of discussion about the nature and the origin of the State, which is usually represented as being an entity over and above the human individuals who make up a society, having as one of its attributes something called 'sovereignty', and sometimes spoken of as having a will (law being often defined as the will of the state) or as issuing commands. The State, in this sense, does not exist in the phenomenal world; it is a fiction of the philosophers. What does exist is an organisation, i.e. a collection of individual human beings connected by a complex system of relations." See also Claessen & Skalník (1978) 4.

35. Let me add that I disagree with the politico-philosophical dogma that the concept of state emerged in the 17th century, philosophically with Hobbes and politically with the Peace of Westphalia. *Stricto sensu* the modern concept of the state as "an abstract juristic person" goes back to Hobbes (see now Skinner [1999]); but in its concrete sense, as "a *sovereign government* enforcing a legal order over a *population* within a *territory*" the state can be traced back no further than ca. 1750, and this tripartite concept did not catch on until the 19th century, see Hansen (1998) 107-13: "How Old is the State?". On the other hand, unlike many sociologists and anthropologists, I can see no reason to scrap the concept of sovereignty and the concept of the state as an abstract public power above both ruler and ruled. My point is rather that essential aspects of both concepts can be traced back through the Middle Ages to classical antiquity. For a comparison between the modern concept of state and the ancient Greek concept of *polis*, emphasising both differences and similarities, see Hansen (1998) 114-23.

36. Fried (1960) 729-30 (pristine versus secondary states); Trigger (1993) 13-4. – Pristine state formation only twice in world history: Crone (1986) 67-8.

37. Trigger (1968) 53 and (1972) 576 with n. 7.

38. Excavations of, e.g., Elkab, Hierakonpolis, Elephantine and Edfu have revealed remains of fortified towns dating back even before the Early Dynastic Period, see, e.g., Bietak (1979) 97-144.

39. See Grube, *infra*. For a critical view, see Webster (1997) 135-54.

40. The palace at Jiren in the "early state" Jimma in southwestern Ethiopia, Claessen & Skalník (1978) 328-9, classified as a "capital" (538). Buschoong, the "capital" of Kuba, an "early state" in Zaire, (360), Waiguyo, the "capital" of Yatenga, an "early state" in Upper Volta (479).

41. Tahiti (Claessen [1978] 446), cf. Oliver (1974) III 1171-1216, and Hawaii (Seaton [1978] 280, 286), cf. Earle (1997) who describes the political organisation of the Hawaiian Islands as chiefdoms (33-46), and speaks about a Hawaiian state only after the arrival of Captain Cook in 1778 (44).

42. Claessen & Skalník (1978) 131-50 (Steinhart on Ankole), and 511-30 (Kandert on Zande).

43. Morgan (1986) 84-111; Krader (1978) 96-107.

44. The gigantic armies of Asiatic nomads (the Huns, the Tatars, and the Mongols) are briefly mentioned on page 60 and described as tribal communities.

45. *League of Nations Treaties Series*, vol. 165 p. 19: "The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a government; and (d) a capacity to enter into relations with other states."

46. *Yearbook of the International Law Commission* (1949) p. 68 § 63. See Duursma (1996) 113.

47. Let me add, however, that city-states and small nomadic states were lying side by side in Central Asia on the fringes of the Taklamakan desert, see Di Cosmo, *infra* 396-7.

48. Blindheim (1976) 73-82. See Holm, *infra* 251.

49. Clarke & Ambrosiani (1995) 68; Helle & Nekvitne (1977) 208.

50. Andrén (1989) 128-49. According to Andrén the formation of a Christian state can be traced back to the 10th century in Denmark, to ca. 1000 in Norway and ca. 1100 in Sweden. Most of the towns were subordinate to the king and often founded by the king, a strong indication that state formation preceded urbanisation (129, 131-4). Denmark was, in fact, united into one kingdom in the early 8th century, and the earliest urban centres were Ribe (8th century) and Hedeby (founded by king Godfred ca. 800), followed in the tenth century by Aarhus, Odense and Roskilde, see Olsen (1989) 27-32.

51. Trigger [1972] 576. Cf. also Scarre & Fagan (1997) 6: "Today, archaeologists use the term *civilization* as a shorthand for urbanized state-level societies," further developed 26f.

52. Stein (1998) discusses Mehrgarh in a section entitled "Communities without States".

53. For Egypt, see *infra* 23. For the Inca empire and earlier cities in the Andes, see Kolata (1997); von Hagen & Morris (1998). For the medieval European cities, see Tilly & Blockmans (1994).

54. For the history of this term, see *infra* 599 with note 8.

55. Burke (1986) 142; Trigger (1993) 8; Yoffee (1997) 256, 258, 262.

56. Held (1995) 77: "The Westphalian model ... which entrenched, for the first time, the principle of territorial sovereignty in international affairs."

57. For *polis/chora* (Greek) see Hansen, *infra* 152; for *ilu/ileto* (Yoruba) see Peel, *infra* 508; for *guo/ye* (Chinese) see Lewis, *infra* 367-8; for *negara/desa*, see Geertz (1980) 4. In Hausa *birni* is the word meaning, principally, walled town, see Griffeth, *infra* 484. It has strong political overtones and one may, for example, speak about two *birane* being at war with one another. The hinterland of a town is called *karkara*. *Birni* and *karkara* may be used as opposed or rather complementary terms. *Karkara* denotes the inhabited hinterland (as opposed to *daji*, meaning bush), but *karkara* has no political connotation. I should like to thank Professor Furniss of SOAS, London for the information about Hausa usage.

58. *Qrt* (Phoenician); *polis* (Greek); *civitas* (Latin); *città* (Medieval and Renaissance Italian); *ilu* (Yoruba); *birni* (Hausa); *oman* (Akan, meaning 1. town, 2. kingdom); *mji* (Swahili); *guo* (Chinese); *negeri* (Malay from Sanskrit); *müang* (Tai); *ahawlel* (Maya); *yuhuitaya* (Mixtec); *altepetl* (Aztec). In the Ijo language (spoken in the Niger Delta city-states) the word for king was *amanyanabo*, meaning "owner of the town" (Ryder [1984] 346).

59. For non-urbanised micro-states, see Di Cosmo, *infra* 396.

60. See Hansen (1994a) 10-13. The concept of city-state culture owes much to the peer polity interaction module, for which see Renfrew & Cherry (1986) 2. The principal differences are the following. (a) Focusing on city-states I exclude chiefdoms and polities composed of villages and/or tribal units. (b) A standard modular area of ca. 1,500 km² is too large whereas an average number of ca. ten polities in a region is too small. (c) Dissociating the concept of city-state from the concepts of independence and autonomy, I question the "peer" aspect of many of these polities and find it necessary in many city-state cultures to stress the hierarchical organisation of the city-states.

61. The major revisions of the original concept of city-state culture (Hansen [1994a] 12-3) are the following: *re (3)*: there are many more examples than Tuscany of regions that twice – or even three times – have been split up into city-states. *Re (4)*: emergence of a city-state culture by disintegration of a larger political unit is much more common than I imagined in 1991. *Re (9)*: instead of economic self-sufficiency it is now economic interaction between the city-state which I take to be an essential characteristic of a city-state culture. Characteristics emphasised for the first time in the description here are (8), (9) and 14.

62. In some cases the region is populated by peoples who speak different languages of which one, however, serves as a "lingua franca". Malay was the lingua franca used in the Southeast Asian city-states, see Reid, *infra* 418. For Hausa as a commercial lingua franca, see Griffeth, *infra* 492. The Makari dialect was known to all Kotoko, see Hansen, *infra* 531. In Central Mexico, Nahuatl was the lingua franca of the Aztec, see Smith, *infra* 589. The Maya hieroglyphs served as a kind of lingua franca, see Grube, *infra* 561.

63. One of the most short-lived city-state cultures is the hiberno-Norse in medieval Ireland. City-state cultures which persisted for over a millennium are the Mesopotamian, the Greek, the Taklamakan and the Chinese (if one includes the city-state kingdoms of the Shang and Western Zhou dynasties).

64. Examples of (3a) are the Sumerian, Syrian, Palestinian, Philistine, Neo-Babylonian, Etruscan, Latin, Arab, Italian, Swiss, Dutch, Chinese, Taklamakan, Tai, Mzâb, Hausa, Yoruba, Fante, Kotoko, Maya, Aztec and Mixtec city-state cultures. Examples of (3b) are the Phoenician (colonies), Greek

(colonies), Viking, Malay, Niger Delta and Swahili city-state cultures. Examples of (3c) are the Phoenician and Greek city-state cultures in which communication between city-states in the homeland is often over land. Sriwijaya on Sumatra is an example of a city-state culture in which all communication between the city-states is along the rivers. In the Arab and Taklamakan city-state cultures communication was along the caravan routes.

65. Examples of (4a) are the Sumerian (first phase), Syrian (first phase), Palestinian (first phase), Assyrian, Phoenician (homeland), Greek (homeland), Etruscan, Latin, Arab, Taklamakan, Sriwijaya, Tai, Hausa, Yoruba, Kotoko, Fante, Niger Delta, Swahili, and Maya city-state cultures. Examples of (4b) are the Philistine, Viking, Mzâb, and Aztec city-state cultures, plus the Greek and Phoenician colonies in, e.g., Sicily. Examples of (4c) are the Sumerian city-states in the Isin-Larsa period (ca. 2000-1800 B.C.) emerging by disintegration after the break-down of the Ur III dynasty (Postgate [1992] 43-5; Kuhrt [1995] 74; Baines & Yoffee [1998] 208) *pace* Glassner, *infra* 000; the Syrian city-states after ca. 1000 B.C.; the Neo-Babylonian city-states in the 9th and 8th centuries B.C.; the Swiss city-states emerging after the extinction of the Dukes of Zähringen in 1218; the Chinese city-states of the Spring-and-Autumn period; the Maya city-states of the Post-Mayapan period; the Mixtec city-states of the Postclassic period. – In northern Italy most of the Roman cities survived into the Middle Ages (La Rocca [1992] 161), and centralised political power was re-established first with the Lombards and later with the Carolingians. But the dissolution of the Frankish kingdom north of Rome set in with the death of Louis II in 875 (Epstein, *infra* 278). Thus, the emergence of the Italian city-states can reasonably be seen as a fragmentation of a macro-state into small political units, mostly cathedral cities ruled by bishops (*città*, see Chittolini [1990]). Later, in connection with the upsurge of urbanisation in the 11th century, these *città* were transformed into what modern historians call city-states.

66. One possible example is the conquest by Ur of all the other Sumerian cities during the so-called Third Dynasty of Ur (2112-2004 B.C.), whereby the city-states were, apparently, reduced to the status of provincial cities. See, e.g., Postgate (1992) 41-3; Kuhrt (1995) 56-73. A related example is northern Italy where, in the course of the 14th and 15th century, all the city-states were swallowed up by Florence, Milan, Venice and the Papal State.

67. Even among the Mzâb city-states wars are attested in the historical record, principally between Beni S'Guen and Melika, see Masqueray (1886) 211-14.

68. Examples are Carthage, conquering the other Phoenician colonies in north Africa and south Spain, see Niemeyer, *infra* 105; Argos, conquering the minor city-states in Argolis, see Hansen, *infra* 170; Florence conquering other city-states in Tuscany, and Venice those in the Veneto, see Epstein, *infra* 288; Suoju and other major Taklamakan city-states conquering their smaller neighbours in the 3rd century A.D., see Di Cosmo, *infra* 401; Aceh conquering some other Malay city-states in northern Sumatra, see Reid, *infra* 426; Tututepec, conquering all the neighbouring Mixtec city-states, see Lind, *infra* 576.

69. Examples of mini-empires of city-states are Ebla in Syria, see *infra* 60-1; Lakedaimon and Syracuse in the ancient Greek world, see *infra* 613; Sriwijaya in Sumatra, see *infra* 411-2; Oyo and later Ibadan in Yorubaland, see *infra* 512-4.

70. The differentiation between outsiders and "insiders" (often = citizens) is attested in the following city-state cultures: Assyrian; Phoenician (Carthage, see Ameling [1993] 260-5); Neo-Babylonian; Hellenic; Etruscan (see Pallotino [1974] 127, 131ff); Latin; Italian; Swiss; Dutch; Chinese; Tai; Mzâb; Hausa; Yoruba; Fante and Swahili.

71. The Palestinian city-states collapsed ca. 2300 B.C. and again ca. 1200 B.C.; the Syrian city-states collapsed ca. 2300 B.C.; the Maya city-states collapsed ca. 900 A.D.

72. City-state cultures annihilated by neighbouring powers are: the Sumerian and Syrian (first phase) when conquered by Sargon of Akkad in ca. 2350 B.C; the Philistine when conquered by the Babylonians in 605 B.C. (Strange 15); the Dutch when the Dutch Republic was conquered by France in 1795; the Chinese of the Spring-and-Autumn period when conquered by the four neighbouring macro-states: Qi, Jin, Qin and Chu; The Taklamakan city-states when subdued by China in the late 18th century (Di Cosmo); the Malay city-states when conquered first by the Portuguese and later by the Dutch (ca. 1511-1625); the Hausa when they succumbed to the Fulani (1804-12); the Fante when destroyed by the Asante (1806-14); the Mzâb, Yoruba, Kotoko, and Niger Delta when conquered by the European colonial powers at the end of the 19th century.

73. The Phoenician cities seem to have persisted as city-states under Assyrian, Persian and Greek domination: the Hellenic, Etruscan and Latin city-states, survived for some centuries as *poleis* and *civitates* under Roman rule; the Viking city-states survived under Irish overlordship until the English conquest in 1171; the Maya (second period), the Mixtec and the Aztec city-states survived for some generations after the Spanish conquest. – The Arab city-states became integrated into the Islamic Caliphate in the course of the 7th century; The Swiss city-states were transformed into members of a modern federal state in 1848.

74. All the city-state cultures along the Fertile Crescent form one such cluster, *viz.*, the Summerian, Syrian, Palestinian, Assyrian, Phoenician, Philistine and Neo-Babylonian city-states. The Etruscan and the Latin city-state cultures form another group, and so do the Medieval Italian, Swiss and South-German city-states. In South-East Asia the Malay and Tai are contiguous city-state cultures together with those whose language was Javanese or Makassarese. In West Africa the Fante, Yoruba, Hausa, Niger Delta and Kotoko civilisations form a cluster of city-state cultures to which one can add the Akwamu and Asante. The Maya, Aztec and Mixtec city-state cultures in Mesoamerica are yet another example of contiguous city-state cultures.

75. Sumerian/Neo-Babylonian; Syrian (2600-2300, 2000-1800, 1000-720 B.C.); Palestinian (2900-2300, 2000-1200 B.C.); Phoenician homeland (Middle Bronze Age and Iron Age); Etruscan/Italian; Taklamakan; Sriwijaya/Malay; Maya (250-900, 1450-1600 A.D.).

76. For the concept of the micro-state, see Duursma (1996), Ehrhardt (1970).

77. E.g. the island of Belbina south of Attica. It covered 8 km² and was a member of the Delian League in the 5th century B.C., see *infra* 155.

78. A different approach leads to a similar result. The Italian word for "local patriotism" is *campanilismo*. The explanation is that, traditionally, the immediate hinterland of a *città* was believed to be as much land as one could see from the top of

the *campanile* in the urban centre. If the view is not obstructed by mountains *vel sim.* the visual range from the top of a campanile is something like 25-30 km.

79. The smallest are some of the oasis-states on the fringes of the Taklamakan desert, which, according to the report drawn up by Zhang Quian ca. 100 B.C., had some 200 inhabitants altogether, see Di Cosmo, *infra* 397.

80. This observation applies to most of the Sumerian city-states (e.g. Ur and Uruk). One exception is Lagash, see *infra* 38. Other city-state cultures in which the name of state is usually the same as the name of the city are, with one example in brackets for each city-state culture: the Syrian (Ebla); the Assyrian (Assur); the Phoenician (Tyros); the Philistine (Gaza); the Neo-Babylonian (Nippur); the Greek (Athenaioi); the Etruscan (Tarquinienses); the Latin (Populus Tusculanus); the Arab (Mecca); the Italian (Siena); the Swiss (Basel); the Chinese (Teng); the Taklamakan (Shulo [but there are numerous exceptions to the rule]); the medieval Malay (Sriwijaya); the Malay (Aceh); the Tai (Sing); the Mzâb (Ghardâya); the Fante (Mankessim); the Yoruba (Ilesha); the Hausa (Rano); the Kotoko (Goulfeil); Niger Delta (Ibani); Swahili (Kilwa); the Maya (Tikal); the Mixtec (Jaltapec); the Aztec (Yautepec).

81. One exception is, again, Sumerian Lagash, which had two other urban centres, *viz.*, Girsu and Nimin, see *infra* 39. Other examples of Sumerian city-states with more than one urban centre are Uruk with Kullaba as its second (but much smaller) urban centre, and Kish with Hursagkalama as the other urban centre (Baines and Yoffee [1998] 208). Some of the large Hausa city-states had a number of provincial towns in addition to the capital, see *infra* 489, 491.

82. One example is the Greek city-state of Elis which may have had two political centres: Elis town and Olympia, see Hansen & Fischer-Hansen (1994) 86-9.

83. I find that centralisation is one of the characteristics which distinguishes a city-state from most early types of macro-state, e.g., the medieval European states. I note, however, that the prevailing view is to oppose city-states and empires and to hold that empires are centralised, but city-states decentralised, see, e.g., Kristiansen (1991) 25. The problem with this view is that no distinction is made between city-state and city-state culture. It is correct that the splitting up of a region into a number of city-states means maximised decentralisation when the whole region is taken into account; but, conversely, it is also correct that government of the individual city-state is usually more centralised than government of any type of macro-state.

84. Arist. *Pol.* 1252b27-53a1; 1261b10-4; 1275b20-1; 1291a9-10; 1326b2-8; 1328b16-8. For the demographic and ethical aspects of Aristotelian *autarkeia*, see Hansen in (1995) 37-8.

85. Griffeth & Thomas (1981) xiii: "Each [city-state] also had a policy of striving for economic self-sufficiency"; Charlton & Nichols (1997) 1: "the whole unit, city plus hinterlands, is relatively self-sufficient economically."

86. For the Athenians taking pride in not being self-sufficient, see Thuc. 2.38 and *infra* page 615. Other examples include the Malay city-states: in 1511 the Portuguese conquerors of Melaka noted that "Melaka has nothing of its own, and has everything of the world," (see Reid, *infra* page 420).

87. The Vatican City is unique and, apart from being properly classified as a micro-state, it does not belong in any other category, see Duursma (1996) 374-419.

88. Duursma (1996) 145-373. For the Vatican, which is so peculiar a community that I prefer to leave it out in this context, see Duursma (1996) 374-419.

89. In Liechtenstein the name of the capital is Vaduz. Luxembourg is, originally, the name of the castle but became the name of the town when an urban centre grew up around the castle.

90. Toynbee (1970) 54; Griffeth & Thomas (1981) xv; Charlton & Nichols (1997) 2.

91. Noticed by Toynbee (1970) 54: "the last refuge of city-states in the present-day Western World is Switzerland".

92. Wagner (1975) 291, referred to as a city-state in Fage (1978) 113. I should like to thank Ib Friis, professor of Botany at Copenhagen University, for drawing my attention to this example of an isolated African city-state.

93. Glassner (*infra* 35-6) holds that city-state is, essentially, a synonym for *polis* and that the concept of city-state should be restricted to descriptions of the ancient Greek *poleis*, and applied nowhere else. For a similar view, i.e. that the concept of city-state is the concept of *polis* in disguise, see also Feinman & Marcus (1998) 8-9, quoted and countered *infra* 598-601. For the opposite view, i.e. that the concept of city-state is appropriate in descriptions of Sumerian society, see, e.g. Gelb (1960) 320, 328; Larsen (1976) 112-15; Jacobsen (1980) 76; Maisels (1990) 131-98, 269-74, 310-12; Postgate (1992) 28-45; Trigger (1993) 8-9, 64-5; Kuhrt (1995) 1: 74; Stone (1997); Mieroop (1997) 36; Sallaberger (1997) 149 n. 7; Baines & Yoffee (1998) 199-260; Larsen (*infra* 117); Thuesen (*infra* 59). For repeated cycles of Sumerian city-states, see Postgate (1992) 43-5; Kuhrt (1995) 74; Baines & Yoffee (1998) 208.

94. On the Akwamu, see Kea (1980).

95. Moraw (1994) 111, 115.

96. Baines & Joffee (1998) 209. I share the cautious approach of Wenke (1997) 27-49, see especially 43: "The closest approximations to an Athenian or Mesopotamian city-state in Egyptian history were the great towns, such as Karanis, of the first few centuries A.D.".

97. Mogens Trolle Larsen in conversation.

98. An alternative view, aired by Chakrabarti *infra* 375-6, is that of the many hundred urban centres of the Indus civilisation it was the majority and not just the five largest which were polities. In that case the city-state model is highly relevant. I find Chakrabarti's suggestions attractive, and we must hope that future studies will make it possible to make a choice between these two opposed reconstructions of the political organisation of the Indus civilisation.

99. Fletcher (1992) 79-103; Clément (1997).

100. See, e.g., Barrucand & Bednorz (1992) 108: "the new political units were city-states in every case, many of them minute, their internal cohesion resting not on any cultural unity among their inhabitants, but purely on geographical considerations". 109: "All in all, Seville, Toledo and Saragossa outshone the other city-states both in the extent and the duration of their power".

101. Through the Polis Centre's expert on Greek colonies in Spain, Professor Adolfo Dominguez, I have put the question: "Did the *taifa* kingdoms constitute a city-state culture?" to Professor M.J. Viguera, an acknowledged specialist on the *taifa*s. Having read a draft of this introduction her response was that the term city-state cannot be applied in any sense to the *taifa* kingdoms, not even to the smallest ones. I would like here to thank Professor Dominguez and Professor Viguera for their valuable assistance in this matter.

102. For the view that some of the consulate cities were city-states, see Toynbee (1970) 42, 51.
103. For a comprehensive account of the consulate cities see Timbal (1954) and Baratier (1969). For a case study, see Mundy (1954).
104. This appendix is a summary of Oberg (1940) 121-62, and Steinhart (1978) 131-50.
105. Elam (1974) 162, quoting Lugard (1893) 155-60; See Steinhart (1978) 145.
106. This appendix is a summary of Forde (1964).

Additional note. An important aspect of the settlement pattern is the relation between those who live in the urban centre and those who live in the hinterland. (A) In some city-state cultures all inhabitants (or at least all "citizens") have the same status and the same privileges irrespective of where they live. (B) In other city-state cultures there is an opposition between a privileged urban population and a less privileged or sometimes even a servile population living in the countryside. This opposition is often emphasised in studies comparing the Greek *poleis* (type A) and the Italian *città* (type B), see, e.g., Molho, Raaflaub & Emlen (1991); but the same opposition is found in many other city-state cultures. Thus, the Hausa city-states (*infra* 491) are type (A) whereas the Chinese (*infra* 361) are type (B). This aspect of city-state cultures will be pursued in a future study.

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